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TWO SIDES OF A COIN: 
HUNGARY’S RELATIONS WITH
SLOVAKIA AND ROMANIA 
Reid Gronostajski
Introduction
In the past twenty years Hungary’s politi-
cal relationships with two of its neighbors,
Slovakia and Romania, have gone in opposite
directions. Slovakia’s relationship with
Hungary has been plagued by arguments over
a range of issues. These issues include the
Gabc
v
íkovo-Nagymaros dam project, minority
rights, and Hungary’s invasion of Slavic lands
in the 10th century. (Kollai, p. 1) Romania and
Hungary, on the other hand, have taken steps
towards peaceful coexistence in the areas of
environmental cooperation, minority rights,
and economic growth. 
One major event that occurred over 1000
years ago has had the largest impact on
Hungary’s relationship with her neighbors today.
This event was the 10th century Hungarian inva-
sion of both Romanian and Slovakian lands.
While the Hungarian invaders gained total con-
trol of what is now Slovakia, their occupation in
Romania was comparatively limited. As a result,
Austria-Hungary continued to rule Slovakia
until the 20th century, at that time enforcing a
policy of cultural assimilation known as
Magyarization on the Slovak peoples. However,
since Hungary never gained total control over
Romania, Austria-Hungary had less success in
enforcing cultural assimilation on Romanians.
Ultimately, Romania’s relative autonomy allowed
her to gain complete independence following
World War I. The Slovaks, on the other hand,
were joined with the Czechs until 1994, with the
Czechs remaining the true political power of the
Czecho-Slovak pair. Centuries of repression of
Slovakian land, culture, and independence even-
tually poised the nation for a strong nationalis-
tic government in the 1990s. It is this national-
ism that has spelled disaster for relations
between present day Hungary and Slovakia.
Romania, on the other hand, has been less
nationalistic and more willing to peacefully
negotiate with Hungary.
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In this article I describe the current rela-
tionship between Hungary and Slovakia. I
attribute their inability to cooperate as present-
day neighbors to historical issues that have
existed between the two nations, namely the
longstanding Hungarian control of Slovakian
land and culture. In contrast, I compare
Hungarian and Romanian history to their pres-
ent relationship in order to highlight a success
story. For Romania, a lack of Hungarian con-
trol has allowed the two nations to work
towards peace in a calm and democratic man-
ner. Finally, I propose solutions to the ongoing
Hungarian-Slovakian problem. 
21st Century Relations
Recently, the governments of Hungary
and Romania have taken steps toward cooper-
ation, including holding a joint session on
October 20, 2005, during which the “Bridges
into the Future” memorandum was discussed
and approved. The memorandum includes
plans for information technology development,
environmental cooperation, and combining of
social welfare programs between the two
nations. Also covered during this session was a
plan for further cross-border projects, such as
increasing the number of border crossings and
allowing more student communication
between the universities of both nations.
(“Meeting of Hungarian, Romanian Prime
Ministers…,” p. 1) This agreement shows 
that Hungary and Romania have reached a
point of cooperation that will extend into the
areas of economics, infrastructure, and the
environment. 
There is significantly less news of coopera-
tive efforts between Hungary and Slovakia, how-
ever. In 2005 one of the only joint efforts between
the two governments was an effort by their trans-
portation departments to build two bridges across
the Ipoly River; only four bridges currently exist.
However, since 85 percent of costs will be cov-
ered by the EU infrastructure budget (“Hungary,
Slovakia to Build…,” p. 1), one wonders whether
this act of cooperation is simply an attempt to
use allotted EU money or whether it is, in fact, a
cooperative effort. To date, no broad memoran-
da have been signed by the two countries like
those signed by Hungary and Romania.
The relationship of the Hungarian and
Slovakian governments has also been plagued
by political bickering. For example, talks
between Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda of
Slovakia and Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany
of Hungary in April 2005 were cancelled by
Prime Minister Dzurinda when a dispute arose.
The dispute occurred when the Hungarian
State Secretary mentioned the expulsion of
thousands of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia
following World War II. The meeting was
abruptly called to an end. (“Slovak, Hungarian
Leaders Row…,” p. 1) 
Another recent example of political ten-
sion was the sending of a congratulatory letter
by Prime Minister Dzurinda on March 19, 2005,
to Prime Minister Gyurcsany, lauding the ten-
year anniversary of the Basic Treaty between
Slovakia and Hungary on Good Neighborly
Relations. However, this was the extent of the
celebration, as Prime Minister Gyurcsany did
not return the congratulations. (“From the
Slovak Press,” p. 1) The Basic Treaty was orig-
inally meant to ensure the rights of Hungarian
minorities living in Slovakia. However, it was
passed only when the EU and the U.S. threat-
ened Slovakia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir
Meciar, with exclusion from international insti-
tutions. This forced friendship between
Hungary and Slovakia quickly broke down
when the Meciar government passed a law
which allowed for only Slavic to be spoken in
the border regions. (Goldman, pp. 193–94)
Such frequent disagreements have long
plagued the governmental relationship between
Hungary and Slovakia.
Another long-term dispute between the
Slovakian and Hungarian governments is over
the Gabc
v
íkovo-Nagymaros dam, a project which
began during the communist era when
Hungary and Slovakia agreed to jointly build a
hydroelectric dam across the upper Danube.
The project was to supply power and flood pro-
tection to both countries. With the fall of com-
munism, Hungary abandoned the project,
claiming that the dam had been a priority for
the former communist government but not the
current democratic one. They later justified
abandoning the project by finding Hungarian
ecologists who argued that the dam project
would lower water levels along the Danube,
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thus destroying the river ecosystem. Slovakian
ecologists argued, conversely, that the dam
would increase water levels and protect the
ecosystem. To this day, each time both sides
seem to reach an agreement on finishing the
dam, Hungary backs out, using such rhetoric,
and Slovakia counters with its own expert
sources. (“Slovakia, Hungary Resume Talks...,”
p. 1) The dam project has become a political
tool, and neither side has been willing to put
its own national interests aside to complete the
project. (Nagayo, pp. 64–71) 
The views of the average citizens of each
country also correspond to the views of their
respective governments. For instance, in a
recent survey conducted in the Hungarian/
Romanian border regions, people were asked
how they characterized their neighbors. Most
Hungarians described Romanians as friendly,
peaceful, and hard working; Romanians saw
Hungarians as productive, honest, and peace-
ful. Other questions raised by the survey con-
cerned historical events, governmental rela-
tions, and cultural differences. (Szabó, p. 36) In
answer, a large majority of Hungarians and
Romanians (62.9 percent and 82.9 percent
respectively) agreed that good relations
between their governments were an asset.
However, 74.3 percent of Hungarians and 
36.6 percent of Romanians saw historical events
between their countries as a hindrance to
future cooperation. (Szabó, pp. 37–39) This ref-
erence to historical events refers mainly to past
arguments between Hungary and Romania over
control of Transylvania. In this case, Hungarian
citizens recognize that past attempts to invade
Transylvania may have had negative conse-
quences on their present-day relationship with
Romania. Nevertheless, Hungarians and
Romanians still have a positive attitude towards
each other in the border regions. 
Conversely, the Hungarians and
Slovakians living in the border lands, like their
governments, have had their share of skir-
mishes. For example, on July 15, 2005, in the
Slovakian town of Komarno, the Slovak com-
munity nationalist group arranged a rally to
commemorate a Slovakian national holiday.
Hungarians who were visiting the region cre-
ated animosity by shouting pro-Hungarian slo-
gans during the rally. (“Police Settle
Conflict…,” p. 1) Fighting broke out, and two
Hungarians were subsequently detained. The
relationship between the Slovakian and
Hungarian peoples, like that of their govern-
ments, is frequently marred by such bickering.
Ancient History?
To explain the present-day disparity
between the relationships of Romania and
Slovakia with Hungary we must turn to histo-
ry. In this case, the problems in the Danube
region began as early as 895, when the nomadic
Magyar (Hungarian) people invaded the land
and found it inhabited by Slavic (Slovakian)
peoples and Dacians (Romanians). (Lendvai, 
p. 20) Hungarian historian Szabolcs de Vajay,
among many others, views these conquests,
which resulted in the formation of the
Hungarian nation, with pride and honor.
However, other historians such as Jenö Szücs
argue that the invasion of the Magyars essen-
tially destroyed much of the political and cul-
tural development of the indigenous peoples.
They view the invasion of the Magyars as a
tragedy, arguing that it has shaped the present-
day politics of the region in a negative way.
(Lendvai, pp. 20–21) In rebuttal, Hungarian his-
torians have argued that the Slavs and Dacians
were organized into small clans or zhupani that
had little or no political organization. However,
a group of Romanian historians and archaeol-
ogists say that they have found evidence of
political entities or voivodates in the region at
the time. (Castellan, p. 25) Slovakian histori-
ans also found that the kingdom of Great
Moravia had governed the Slovakian people and
provided a cultural and oral influence that sur-
vives to this day. (Kirschbaum, pp. 36–41)
These points represent an ongoing argument
over the nature of the Magyar invasion.
Magyar-Controlled Lands
Though both Romania and Slovakia con-
tinue to argue with Hungary over the nature of
the Hungarian invasion, one indisputable dif-
ference did develop between Slovakia and
Romania in the 10th century. Whereas the
region of the Slavic peoples came entirely under
the control of the Magyars, the Romanians lost
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only Transylvania. Because of its proximity to
present-day Russia and Turkey, Romania had to
fend off the Cumans, Tatars, and Ottomans over
the centuries, rather than the Hungarians. Due
to this fact the voivodates of Wallachia and
Moldavia never came under Hungarian control,
but rather remained under Romanian control.
(Castellan, pp. 26–29) In turn, because of
Romania’s long-standing autonomy, the coun-
try has been able to suppress or avoid hostile
forms of nationalism in later centuries, as will
be shown. On the other hand, the Slavic peo-
ples lost all their land to the Magyars following
their invasion. This loss of Slovakian lands to
the Hungarians ultimately resulted in the cre-
ation of an aggressive form of Slovakian nation-
alism in the 1990s. By leaving the Slovakians
in a politically oppressed state for the next 1000
years, Hungary essentially created a situation
in which hostile nationalism can flourish.
(Kirschbaum, p. 38)
The Effects of Magyarization
Following the Magyar invasion and for the
next nine centuries, Slovakia remained under
Hungarian control while Romania continued
to fight with Hungary over control of
Translvania. (Castellan, p. 97) Not until the end
of the 19th century did the next significant
event occur, the “Magyarization” or cultural
assimilation of the Slavic people in the region.
This forcing of the other peoples of the Danube
region to forsake their own traditions was one
of the major campaigns of the Austro-
Hungarian state. Magyarization specifically
involved teaching only Magyar language and
culture in all Slovakian schools, and excluding
Slovakian speakers from government office.
(Lendvai, p. 299) For the Slovakians this assim-
ilation was especially devastating due to its his-
torical basis. The Hungarian position was that
the Slovakians lived within Hungarian borders,
and therefore had no rights. However, as men-
tioned earlier, the Slovakians never willingly
gave up their land, but were forced to do so by
Magyar invaders. (Kirschbaum, p. 108) Based
on this forced occupation, non-Magyars either
had to be assimilated into Magyar culture or be
excluded from political activity within Slovakia
as well as Hungary. (Kirschbaum, p. 114)
As a result of its relative autonomy,
Romania was not subjected to the same force
of Magyarization during the 19th century. In
contrast, Romania was able to achieve full
autonomy, as well as a rise in national identity.
In fact, as far back as the 18th century the social
elite within Romania had begun a nationalist
drive within the country, as represented by such
books of the period as The Roots of the Daco-
Romanian and Short Historical Outline of the
Daco-Romanian Nation. These works stressed
the ancient origins of Romanians within the
Danube region, the result being an increased
awareness of Romanian nationality and a sub-
sequent desire to regain complete Romanian
independence. (Castellan, pp. 113–14)
Ultimately this movement would lead to
Romanian independence by recognition of the
Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Congress, set
up to re-divide the Balkans following the Russo-
Turkish war, granted the Balkan states a chance
to interject their desires to the European pow-
ers. Being that the subject of Romanian inde-
pendence had been under discussion in
Romania for many years prior to the Congress,
the Romanians were well prepared to take
advantage of these peace talks, and thus were
granted independence. (Linden, p. 127) 
Though culturally oppressed by Hungary,
Slovakians did show similar signs of national-
ism, with the formation of the Slovak National
Council (SNC) in 1848. The SNC was a highly
symbolic council that stood for the Slovakian
desire for national identity and that attempted
to get Slovakian officials elected to office.
(Kirschbaum, p. 119) Regardless of these
nationalist desires, in 1884 the SNC was unable
to get any Slovakians elected to office in
Budapest, and subsequently demonstrated elec-
toral passivity for the rest of the 19th century.
(Kirschbaum, p. 140) Due mainly to its long
history of governance under Hungary, Slovakia
was viewed as politically weak, and therefore
was unable to fulfill its own political desires
through the SNC. At this point one can see that
Hungary’s earlier invasion of Slovakia left it in
a state of cultural and political weakness, as
seen by Magyarization and the powerlessness
of the SNC, respectively. At the same time,
Romania’s relative autonomy from Hungary
allowed it to further its own political and cul-
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tural desires during the 18th and 19th cen-
turies, thus widening the gap between the rela-
tions of Slovakia and Romania with Hungary.
The Widening Relations Gap
Romania began World War I as politically
neutral, but the presence of Allied encamp-
ments in the Hungarian-controlled region of
Transylvania and a Romanian treaty with the
Allied Powers caused Germany to declare war
on Romania in 1916. (Castellan, p. 155) After
much bloodshed and the conclusion of the war,
Romania was able to negotiate the return of
Transylvania during peace talks. A delegate of
Romania at the time, Take Ionescu gathered
supporters to form a National Council of
Romanian Unity to address the issue. Through
extensive negotiations with the Allied Powers,
Ionescu’s council was able to get approval for
the creation of Unified Greater Romania on
January 11, 1919. (Castellan, pp. 163–64) One
reason Romania was able to accomplish this
feat was that, as discussed earlier, the Romanian
elite had dedicated themselves to the return of
Romanian independence. Having this nation-
alist base enabled Romania to take full advan-
tage of peace talks after World War I. (Castellan,
p. 147)
Unlike Romania, which gained land after
World War I, Slovakia gained neither land nor
independence, and became instead a part of
Czechoslovakia. While Slovakia was eager to
gain autonomy, it was not in a position at the
time to become fully independent. Three prob-
lems seemed to push the Slovaks toward the
decision to join the Czechs: they lacked politi-
cal organization; the continued oppression of
Magyarization led Slovakians to distrust gov-
ernment organizations; and the international
community viewed the Slovakians as govern-
mentally weak, especially in light of their lack
of interest in holding governmental offices dur-
ing the late 19th century. For these reasons, it
was reasonable to western nations that Slovakia
should be grouped with the more politically
seasoned Czechs. Slovakia’s agreement to join
with the Czechs was an indication of this
dependence. (Kirschbaum, pp. 155–59) Again,
it is important to note that the continuing
divergence between the statuses of Slovakia and
Romania in the 20th century has been ulti-
mately a result of Hungary’s long-standing con-
trol over Slovakia and relative lack of control
over Romania. With a history of oppression
under Hungary, Slovakia was in no position to
govern herself, something which was not the
case in historically autonomous Romania.
Nazism and Communism
Unlike during the earlier periods men-
tioned, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia all
faced equal hardships under the Third Reich.
An agreement to side with Germany was inde-
pendently made by all three countries, due in
part to the protection they thought Germany
could provide from Russia. (Castellan, p. 200)
In Slovakia’s case the decision to side with
Germany was influenced by the fact that the
Third Reich granted Slovakia independence
from the Czech Republic. However, the perma-
nence of this change was an illusion as Slovakia
was rejoined with the Czech Republic follow-
ing the German defeat. (Goldman, pp. 6–9) 
In addition, Romania lost much of her
Transylvanian lands when they were given to
Hungary by Germany. (Castellan, pp. 204–205)
Due to the fact that these unfortunate out-
comes for both Slovakia and Romania could be
blamed on Germany, it is unlikely that they
caused any observable differences in current
relations with Hungary.
The period of governance under the Soviet
Union, on the other hand, did produce a notice-
able outcome in the three countries. Under the
overarching power and repression of the Soviet
government, interaction between Hungary,
Romania, and Slovakia was limited. (Kun, p. 25)
Another result was that, due to this repression,
fervent nationalism began to grow in the three
countries. For instance, Nicolae Ceaus,escu, the
Romanian dictator from 1965 on, was vehe-
mently anti-Soviet and pro-Romanian.
(Tismaneanu, p. 86). Evidence of Slovakian
nationalism included attempts by Slovaks to
organize a nationalist group, with their goal
being to gain some level of political autonomy.
(Kirschbaum, pp. 247–48) Hungary, in turn,
showed its desire for national independence
with the revolution of 1956, during which 2,700
Hungarians died. (Lendvai, p. 453) The nation-
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alism produced by this communist oppression
would ultimately provide the spark for future
disagreements among the countries of Eastern
Europe, especially Hungary, Slovakia, and
Romania. For the Slovaks, this nationalist spark
has been wielded in the case of Hungarian
repression, with decidedly harmful conse-
quences for relations between the two nations.
Conversely, Romania’s historic autonomy has
allowed it to escape tensions with Hungary,
regardless of nationalistic tendencies on both
sides.
Slovakia Turns the Tide
After discussing at length the differing his-
tories of Slovakia and Romania in relation to
Hungary, I relate those differences to the way
in which they have affected recent relations
with Hungary. In the case of Slovakia, one
thousand years under cultural, governmental,
and territorial control left Slovaks eager for a
chance to regain their independence. The
results of a 1991 survey showed that an over-
whelming 73 percent of Slovaks wanted inde-
pendence. (Hilde, p. 652) The catalyst for even-
tual independence came in 1992 when the
political party called the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) was formed, lead-
ing to Slovakia’s permanent break from the
Czech republic in 1994. 
The first change in Slovakia’s relationship
with Hungary came when the HZDS won the
largest portion of votes (37.3 percent) in the
1992 Parliamentary elections, giving it the
largest number of seats (74) of any party in
Parliament. The HZDS Party’s success lay in its
role as defender of Slovakia and its focus on
Slovakian national identity, an identity which
had been historically lacking due to Hungarian
oppression. (Haughton, 2001, pp. 746–47) One
of the most controversial members of the HZDS
was Vladimir Meciar, the elected Prime Minister
from 1990–1998. While the importance of the
HZDS should not be underestimated, Meciar,
above all other members, gave a voice to the
concerns of the Slovakians during a confusing
time. He frequently referred to himself as the
father of the nation, while referring to political
rivals as enemies of Slovakia. (Haughton, 2003,
pp. 267–69) This highly confrontational nation-
alism was directed at various sources, especial-
ly Hungary. In fact, it was the belief of many
HZDS politicians that Hungary’s major agenda
was to regain control of Slovakia. (Goldman, 
p. 187) For this reason, Meciar’s government
sought an alliance with “traditional” allies such
as Russia. (Linden, p. 138) The Meciar govern-
ment was characterized by unwillingness to
cooperate with its western neighbors and
Hungary.
Following the election of the HZDS, a sec-
ond major change was to occur to the Slovakian
political landscape. In 1994 Slovakia officially
became a fully autonomous state. The decision
came as a direct result of the HZDS Party being
unwilling to accept the new Czech terms of
governance after the 1992 elections. However,
many historians agree that the real underlying
cause of the split was Slovak nationalism, the
nationalism supported by the HZDS. (Hilde, 
pp. 647–48) By the end of the 1990s, Slovakia
was in a position of true autonomy and under
the control of a strong nationalist party, a com-
bination that has created much tension in
Slovakia’s present relationship with Hungary.
More importantly, one can see that the HZDS’s
nationalist stance has been both justified and
fueled by the history of Hungarian oppression.
Meciar and the HZDS have successfully used
Hungarian oppression as the basis of their polit-
ical power. 
Romania’s interaction with Hungary, on
the other hand, took a very different turn dur-
ing the 1990s. The decade began with attacks
on Hungarians by Romanians in the Romanian
province of Tirgu Mures in March 1990. The
attacks were a result of arguments over minor-
ity rights in the border regions. In response,
both governments adopted a decidedly nation-
alist stance. Hungarian Prime Minister Antall
stated that he was prime minister of fifteen mil-
lion Hungarians, with five million of them
being Romanians living in the border regions.
Romania, in turn, replaced Hungarian officials
in shared regions of Transylvania with
Romanian officials. (Linden, p. 129) Though the
two countries would begin the decade with
problems, this tense situation soon changed as
the decade continued. (Schöpflin, p. 16) 
Romania’s turning point came when the
Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) under the
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leadership of president Ion Iliescu took major-
ity control of Parliament from 1990 to 1996.
(Tismaneanu, p. 91) Much like the HZDS, the
PDSR Party stressed Romanian nationalism and
endorsed returning national independence to
Romania. However, the PDSR was also com-
mitted to working with its neighbors in
Hungary and the West with the aim of political
and economic partnership. (Linden, p. 128) Due
to a relative lack of Hungarian control exerted
over Romania throughout the centuries,
Romania’s PDSR was much more willing to
cooperate with other nations than was
Slovakia’s HZDS. Furthermore, the power held
by the PDSR Party ensured that any other par-
ties expressing dislike of western integration
were weeded out in future elections. (Linden,
p. 138) The PDSR’s majority control also
allowed President Iliescu to pass more than 800
decrees during his presidency. (Roper, p. 169)
It was Iliescu’s Parliamentary-granted presi-
dential power that would ultimately allow him
to make a landmark agreement with Hungary.
In August 1995, Romanian President Ion
Iliescu made the first attempt to resolve the
issue of Hungarian/Romanian arguments over
Transylvania by proposing a treaty. Signed by
both countries, the basis of the treaty was trust,
respect, and the recognition of mistakes made
in the past. Specifically, both countries recog-
nized that the arguing over Transylvania should
cease and that the nations should instead have
shared control over border regions. (Weiner, 
p. 494) Applying the treaty to minority rights,
both countries agreed to grant special status to
their Hungarian and Romanian minorities.
(“Treaty between the Republic of Hungary…,”
p. 1) From this point on, Hungary and Romania
have taken other steps toward cooperation, as
mentioned earlier. Unlike Slovakia, Romania’s
lack of historic tensions with Hungary has
allowed her to reach a peaceful resolution. 
In his article on the issue of current
Hungarian/Romanian relations, Ronald Linden
(2000) concludes that a number of other fac-
tors have contributed to the success of the
treaty. First of all, both countries were operat-
ing within democratic systems, where cooper-
ative discussion was valued over fighting. In
addition, the EU granted considerable incen-
tives to both nations in order that an agreement
could be reached. Both countries were anxious
to join in the economic prosperity of the West
and, therefore, saw their chance in EU integra-
tion. Finally, both the Hungarian and
Romanian governments were able to keep
nationalist agendas in check. (Linden, p. 135)
These key factors produced an environment
conducive to the formation of the Hungarian/
Romanian treaty.
At this point one must ask why Hungary
and Slovakia could not have reached a similar
level in foreign relations, especially in view of
the fact that they also signed a 1995 treaty. The
EU was also involved in the Hungarian/
Slovakian treaty process. Furthermore, both
Slovakia and Hungary were democratic nations
in the 1990s. The only discernible difference is
the stance of the Meciar-led government versus
that of the Iliescu-led government. The
Slovakian HZDS clearly expressed its dislike of
Western integration as well as antipathy toward
cooperation with Hungary. (Linden, p. 138) The
hostile rhetoric of the Meciar government
toward Hungary created a tension that could
not be resolved even with a treaty. As men-
tioned earlier, Romania’s PDSR Party was much
more willing to work with Hungary and 
the West.
In Linden’s analysis, no clear explanation is
given as to why the hostile Meciar government
took power in Slovakia while the relatively diplo-
matic Iliescu government took power in
Romania. In this article I have argued that
Hungary’s differing level of control over Romania
and Slovakia throughout the centuries was in
part responsible for producing these two very dif-
ferent governments. Slovakia’s long history of
oppression under the Hungarians provides a
plausible explanation for the present-day tensions
between the two countries. (Goldman, p. 187)
This oppression led to the Slovakian desire to
elect a government that opposed cooperation
with Hungary and sought to protect Slovakian
interests, something which was not the case in
Romania. Certainly there were many in the gov-
ernments of Hungary and Romania who opposed
mutual cooperation, but the absence of past
oppression by Hungary toward Romania allowed
Iliescu and the PDSR to achieve peace in a ratio-
nal and democratic manner, regardless of doubts
on both sides. (Weiner, p. 500) 
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Looking Forward
A number of solutions have been proposed
to ease Hungarian/Slovakian tensions. The first
would rely on the shared histories of both
nations. Both Hungary and Slovakia have exist-
ed side by side for at least 1000 years, suggest-
ing that there must be some social and politi-
cal similarities. (Kollai, p. 1) Both have
experienced national trauma because of the
Nazis and communists, but both have emerged
as democratic neighbors. The two nations’ join-
ing of the EU has also given them incentives to
live up to the following goals of the European
Union:
(A) desire to deepen the solidarity
between their (Europe’s) peoples
while respecting their history, their
culture and their traditions…[and] a
resolve to continue the process 
of creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe.
(“Consolidated Version of the
Treaty…,” pp. 5–6)
Whether through financial incentives or the sim-
ple mediation of disputes, Hungary and Slovakia
would be well-advised to rely on the assistance
of the EU to help solve their problems.
However helpful a shared past can be to the
dispute, the only real solution is for Hungary and
Slovakia to recognize their past and to move
beyond the Hungarian oppression of Slovakians.
(Kollai, p. 1) Oppression has been the basis of
Slovakian hatred of Hungarians for a very long
time, and Hungary must formally acknowledge
the effects of centuries of oppression on the
Slovakian mind. In turn, Slovakia must be will-
ing to recognize Hungary as a nation far
removed from its oppressive past. It would be
useful to hold a summit meeting including
scholars, officials, and citizens of both countries.
The goal placed before the summit meeting
would be to illuminate what actually happened
in the past as well as to understand that the cur-
rent democratic nations of Hungary and Slovakia
are different than their historical counterparts.
Romania made such a distinction in its treaty
with Hungary with great success. (Linden, 
p. 135) The only way for the two nations to coop-
erate is to accept their different pasts but at the
same time to move toward a collective future.
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